The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) offered very little gain to Malaysia. Trade growth claims in government commissioned pro-TPPA reports were premised on access to the US market, which is no longer on offer with TPP11, now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP (CPATPP). However, the most onerous aspects – such as enhanced IPRs and ISDS – remain, threatening the national and public interest.
In normal circumstances, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) would be dead and buried by now after President Trump announced US withdrawal immediately after his inauguration early this year. After all, all major US presidential candidates last year had opposed the TPPA before the election.
TPPA not about trade gains
Ostensible trade gains from the TPPA were derived using dubious techniques and assumptions. Supposed gains were miniscule, especially over the long-term horizon involved. Even pro-TPPA economists conceded that it offered little growth due to trade liberaliSation, contrary to the political and media hype.
To be sure, the original TPPA had little to do with trade liberalisation. Claims of gains from trade liberalization were disputed by most analysts, including US government bodies such as the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service and the International Trade Commission (ITC).
The TPPA’s main US cheerleader, the private Peterson Institute of International Economics (PIIE) conceded that most purported gains would come from ‘non-trade issues’ such as additional foreign direct investment (FDI) due to enhanced investor rights.
TPP11: TPPA in drag
In fact, there is no legal basis for proceeding with the TPPA as its original terms killed it if either the US or Japan pulled out.
However, since January, the Japanese and Australian governments have pushed for TPP11, misleadingly presenting it as “TPPA minus USA” while implying that a post-Trump administration would rush to join.
Most major TPPA provisions are expected to remain despite their changed significance without the USA as a party. But renegotiating the deal will require much more than deleting provisions for the US throughout as the Agreement involved a complex tangle of bilateral and other compromises.
Various TPP11 governments have remained ‘on board’ for reasons of their own. Peer pressure, led by Japan, and a last minute agreement to modify some onerous provisions on intellectual property rights (IPRs) has kept Canada on board, so far.
But this will further delay the process as Canada and Mexico sort out their NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) problems, while hoping that others less “gung-ho” (Chile, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, New Zealand) will join them in modifying other provisions.
The Japanese and Australian roles in stalling the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations have exposed their hand in frustrating others’ desire for more inclusive, less corporate-oriented regional economic agreements.
Easing foreign takeover
FDI was also supposed to go up, thanks to the TPPA’s investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. Foreign companies would then be able to sue TPP governments for alleged losses, including of potential future profits, ascribed to policy changes, even if in the national or public interest.
Under ISDS, regulations, already favouring powerful TNCs, would be arbitered by supposedly independent tribunals. This extrajudicial system would supercede national laws and judiciaries, with secret rulings not bound by precedent or subject to appeal.
Thus, rather than trade promotion, the main purpose of the TPPA was to promote more corporate-friendly rules for foreign investors. After all, the 6350-page deal was negotiated by various working groups where representatives of major US TNCs drove the agenda to advance their interests.
No rationale for joining CPATPP
Even the pro-TPPA reports commissioned by the government were mainly premised on access to the US market, which is no longer on offer.
However, onerous aspects, such as enhanced IPRs and ISDS, remain features of the CPATPP, threatening the national and public interest.
Thus, with nothing to gain in terms of market access to the US, TPP11 will mainly strengthen Japanese TNCs and other TPP11 foreign investors. With greater rights for foreign investors, investors – both foreign and Malaysian – will be induced to relocate abroad, in Singapore and elsewhere.
Growth of foreign ownership of the Malaysian economy over the last decade will thus accelerate further with the CPATPP, further undermining prospects of economic transformation under national auspices.
Although the earlier government commissioned studies used to justify joining the TPPA are now irrelevant, Malaysian negotiators appear to have convinced the government that the country will benefit from joining the CPATPP without bothering to persuade parliament, let alone the public.
CPATPP step backward, not forward
Malaysian policymakers are under the illusion that the CPATPP provisions will become the new standard for future trade agreements when, in fact, the converse is likely to be true with growing criticisms of the naïve earlier advocacy of economic liberalisation and strengthened property rights.
Some economic reformers defended the TPPA as means to secure domestic economic reforms in Malaysia, but they should carefully reconsider what is now likely to happen instead.
In any case, reform by subterfuge is never a good proposition.
After securing some minor changes which the Obama administration had not agreed to, the Malaysian Prime Minister now seems to be the sole CPATPP enthusiast despite greater caution expressed by the Trade Minister.
The puzzle remains as to why the PM is so committed to a dubious deal with no benefits for the country.
This is quite different from, say, the ECRL, where lucrative kickbacks and other “leakages” are widely rumoured to be major considerations. Malaysians deserve better and pulling out of the CPATPP would be a good place to start.
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